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Abstract—We present a scalable system for high-throughput,
real-time analysis of heterogeneous data streams. Our architec-
ture enables incremental development of models for predictive
analytics and anomaly detection as data arrives into the system.
In contrast with batch data-processing systems, such as Hadoop,
that can have high latency, our architecture allows for ingest
and analysis of data on the fly, thereby detecting and responding
to anomalous behavior in near real-time. This timeliness is
important for applications such as insider threat, financial fraud,
and network intrusions. We demonstrate an application of this
system to the problem of detecting insider threats. Namely, the
misuse of an organization’s resources by users of the system, and
present results of our experiments on a publicly available insider
threat dataset.
Index Terms—Anomaly Detection, Insider Threat, Streaming
Analytics, Real-time Analytics
I. INTRODUCTION
AT THE dawn of the information age, organizationsfocused a majority of their resources protecting their
assets from compromise by outside forces. A recent rash of
high profile incidents has brought to light a fundamental truth
that security experts have known since at least 44 BC, i.e.
the greatest threat to an organization does not come from
without, but from within. Insiders, operating within the domain
of their normal activities and with the freedom necessary to
efficiently accomplish their tasks, can bypass the elaborate
defenses against external threats to steal critical secrets and/or
damage critical resources. In the digital age the threat posed
by the insider, be they malicious or merely unwitting, has
increased manyfold.
A recent study by the Center for Strategic and International
Studies (CSIS) [1] estimated the total cost of cyber espionage
worldwide to be between $150 - $300 billion per year. The
loss of intellectual property is an obvious deficit, but the full
list of costs, both direct and indirect, illustrates the enormity
of the risk posed by these threats. A 2012 report by the
Zurich Insurance Group [2] identified six sources of direct
loss resulting from an internal data breach, including menu
costs associated with reconfiguring security features after a
data breach, such as reissuing credit cards and changing user
accounts, forensic investigation costs that can range from
$200 to $1500 per hour, customer relations costs, credit
monitoring costs, legal reparation costs, and costs associated
NGIS-DSEA-14-01335
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with additional regulatory processes, such as investigations
launched by federal or state authorities.
In addition to direct costs, there are indirect costs associated
with an insider incident that, while harder to quantify, can be
potentially more damaging. These include reputation damage
that can result in loss of clients and a reduction in business
from retained clients. As an example, the recent light shown
on NSA activity by Snowden has caused significant costs for
US IT providers, as their clients requested that data centers be
moved outside the US as well as significant loss of business
among foreign clients who no longer believe their data is
safe [3]. Another indirect, yet real, cost results from additional
competition due to compromised technology and/or business
plans. As noted in the recent CSIS study [1], “the victim may
not know the reason they were underbid, a negotiation went
badly, or a contract was lost”. A notion of the harm that is
done can be gleaned from a recent theft of proprietary data
from the oil and gas industry. In this case, the theft targeted
“project-financing information with regard to oil and gas field
bids and operations” [4].
The need to mitigate risk associated with the above costs has
spurred the development of numerous tools that aim to prevent
data exfiltration, identify and monitor high risk individuals
within an organization, and so on. A review of the current
work in this field, which we summarize in Section II, reveals
that these efforts fall short in their protection, the flexibility
and maintainability of their preventative measures, and/or the
timeliness of their response.
Our approach to detecting malicious insider actions in
an enterprise is based on automatically identifying unusual
behavior within the stream of actions associated with differ-
ent users within the enterprise’s computational network. The
distinguishing feature of our approach is the use of streaming
analytics in learning typical patterns of behavior occurring
in event streams and in monitoring the streams for deviations
from these patterns. To enable streaming anomaly detection
at scale, we built RADISH (Real-time Anomaly Detection
In Streaming Heterogeneity), a system for rapidly detecting
patterns and anomalies in streaming data.
RADISH ingests and analyzes heterogeneous streams of
data in real-time to detect patterns that span different streams.
In order to scale to large volume streams and provide high-
throughput processing, RADISH integrates open source dis-
tributed processing frameworks that enable it to use the power
of parallel computing on a cluster of computers. A key
technical ingredient in RADISH is the use of novel streaming
machine learning and data mining methods that enable scalable
real-time analytics. These methods build behavioral models of
individual entities as well as aggregated behavior.
In this paper, we describe the overall architecture of
RADISH, a general streaming anomaly detection system. We
show how the RADISH system is particularly applicable to
insider threat detection, and present initial results showing
the effectiveness in detecting malicious insider actions within
a synthetic dataset generated for the DARPA ADAMS pro-
gram [5], [6].
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: in Section II,
we present a brief review of current technologies for massive
on-line data analytics and the state of the field of insider threat
reduction. In Section III, we describe the RADISH design fol-
lowed by details of the current implementation in Section IV.
In Section V, we describe a system based on RADISH for
detecting insider threats, followed by our evaluation on an
independently developed synthetic dataset. We conclude with
a discussion of the results of the experiments and future work
in Section VI.
II. RELATED WORK
The RADISH system advances the state-of-the-art in
streaming analytics and provides a novel approach to insider
threat detection. In this section, we survey related work.
Insider Threat Detection Systems. Currently, most insider
threat mitigation technologies, such as Wave [7], focus specif-
ically on data loss prevention. These technologies use data
encryption, automated remote backup, and document tagging
to ensure that a malicious insider cannot deface, delete, or
exfiltrate sensitive organizational information. This type of
approach fails to address two key features of the malicious
insider problem. First, the insider is usually operating within
the constraints of their normal function, thus, access to and
exfiltration of the sensitive data is not precluded. Second,
document tagging is, in any event, difficult to maintain and
easy to defeat. It’s difficult to maintain since each proprietary
document and all descendant documents to be protected must
be manually identified as sensitive and tagged correspondingly.
This process is easy to defeat, since most tagging mechanisms
are based on hashing the document to a key and storing
that key in a blacklist against which all outgoing documents
are checked. This hash can often be circumvented by simply
adding a single character to the document.
Technologies such as Raytheon’s SureView [8] take a more
holistic approach to mitigating insider threats by compiling
and analyzing multiple sources of information on user behav-
ior, but again suffer from drawbacks associated with gathering,
storing, and analyzing massive amounts of data. SureView al-
lows exhaustive auditing of privileged users, including a DVR-
like playback of the user’s actions. Recording at this level of
fidelity requires a significant amount of storage. Thus, for a
sizable organization, it is resource-prohibitive to store all the
data from all possible users. Thus, the usual mode of operation
is to identify those users who pose potential threats before they
are monitored. Given that detection of the average insider inci-
dent occurs 32 months after the act [9], predetermination is not
a luxury organizations currently possess. Other technologies,
such as Palisade [10], Prelert [11], and Securonix [12], provide
an adaptive approach to identifying malicious behavior by
characterizing network and user behavior based on analyzing
logs after the logs have been collected in a central repository.
Thus, they can provide forensic evidence of how an attack
occurred, but cannot stop an incident that takes only minutes to
carry out. To prevent a determined insider, the security system
must operate in real time1.
In summary, the RADISH approach differs from existing
commercial anomaly detection approaches in three critical
respects. First, all analyses are performed on the stream of
data as it is generated in the system, not on static data sets
that are gathered after the fact. This is advantagous in that it
eliminates the requirement to store prohibitively large amounts
of data for later analysis, thereby allowing for the analysis
of much larger collections of disparate data and enabling
real-time alerts. Second, our analysis considers streams from
many disparate sources rather than a single type of data.
These sources, such as e-mails, browser history, and security
logs, yield a greater depth to our system’s characterization
of employees, assets, and resources reducing the false posi-
tive rate while simultaneously increasing the detection rate.
Finally, at the lowest level, our characterization of normal
behavior is performed automatically and algorithmically. This
has the effect of reducing expense and improving accuracy by
eliminating costly and error-prone hand-coded rules for user
behavior.
The insider threat problem has also been addressed in the
academic literature. [13] uses the synthetic ADAMS dataset
to build and evaluate a multi-domain anomaly detector for
identifying suspicious users. Unlike the approach reported
here, it does so by aggregating features per domain (e.g.
HTTP, email, logon, etc) across all time, and computing
anomaly scores for each user. Furthermore, each domain is first
considered and modeled in isolation, and individual anomaly
scores fused in order to compute a single score. However, if
any set of individual models produce noisy anomaly scores,
they may pollute the final score and decrease the accuracy and
reliability of the system. In addition, using aggregate features
will tend to have a smoothing effect and has the potential
to mask anomalous behavior which occurs in bursts over a
small time scale. We note that [13] does not compare the
anomalous users identified by their system with the malicious
users identified in the dataset. In contrast to the work described
in [13], we focus on individual user sessions and compute an
anomaly score for each, considering all domains at once; that
is, the features we use per session contain information from all
domains, and as a result, implicitly take correlations between
cross-domain events into account. We note that our findings
on this dataset did align with those reported in [13], and we
show that the sessions we identify as anomalous correspond
well with malicious activity.
Distributed Systems and Streaming. According to IBM,
1At the time of publication, vendors are starting to release systems based
on streaming input, however, they still consume significant processing and
storage resources and do not perform real-time analysis on all available data
streams.
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as of 2012, 2.5 exabytes (2.5 × 1018 bytes) of data are gen-
erated every day [14]. Internet-based companies (i.e. Google,
Facebook, etc) generate enormous volumes of log data, cor-
responding to user activity-related events, such as log-ins,
clicks, and search queries [15]. Mining this kind of data can
provide valuable insights into user patterns and preferences,
forming the basis for advertising and recommender systems.
Early architectures designed to ingest and process this data
involved first aggregating it into a single data store (e.g.
HDFS) for offline consumption. While this paradigm is indeed
effective for offline batch-processing of large volumes of
data, it cannot be trivially modified to deal with streaming
applications where decisions must be made quickly in response
to incoming data. Hybrid approaches may use a large amount
of data collected for a pre-specified period of time in order to
train models offline that are then applied in real-time. These
approaches may be viable in a few cases, such as when a
recommender system is attempting to learn user preferences or
when an intrusion detection system monitors network activity
to establish patterns of normalcy. Such an architecture would
still rely on storing the data, which may not be desirable due
to space constraints. Streaming applications, which ingest and
analyze the data as it arrives and dynamically update models,
clearly cannot leverage such an architecture. Implied in the
online requirement for streaming applications is the notion that
data will likely be discarded after being seen and, any analytics
will encounter the data only once. Real time applications, such
as discovering trending topics in social media, determining
current user sentiment, or discovering abnormal activity in
a computer network are just a few examples of areas that
require distributed stream processing architectures. Apache
Storm [16] and Apache Spark Streaming [17] are technolo-
gies that provide distributed stream processing frameworks.
When combined with popular messaging systems, such as
Kafka [15], ActiveMQ [18], and ZeroMQ [19], the can achieve
very high throughput and low latencies for even complex
stream processing.
III. SYSTEM DESIGN
RADISH identifies suspicious activity by simultaneously
analyzing incoming data streams to learn patterns of normal
behavior and, in the context of this learned behavior, search
for anomalous activity that portends abnormal system behav-
ior, such as a data breach or attack from within. RADISH
is composed of two distinct processes; a learning process
(RADISH-L) and an alerting process (RADISH-A) that run
simultaneously and continuously.
RADISH-L analyzes the streams to automatically derive
models representing patterns of normalcy that characterize
the normal operation of a system. (The system may be
an enterprise’s computer network including computers, their
applications, and communications between them, or might be
a complex machine composed of interacting parts with sensors
indicating the status of the parts.) In the case of insider threat
detection, these patterns cover rules about the behavior of
users as well as the usage behavior of resources such as work-
stations, servers, and/or files. RADISH-A matches incoming
event streams against the patterns of normalcy derived by
RADISH-L to detect anomalous system behavior.
The system architecture is depicted in Figure 1. The sensors
originate events, where, in this paper, we define an event to be
a tuple of attributes with a sensor observation timestamp. An
array of sensors is typically deployed within an organization’s
infrastructure at a variety of places, such as user workstations,
routers, firewalls, and servers. The Harmonizer collects the
events, transforms them into a common format, performs
enrichment and identity resolution, and time-orders the events
within a stream. This enriched stream is published to both
RADISH-A, which detects anomalies using a current set of
models, and to RADISH-L, which uses the events to hone
the next generation of models. The models are managed in
a repository that allows RADISH-L to load, update, and save
models that are retrieved by RADISH-A for detection. Finally,
the entire system is monitored and controlled via the controller.
We now present a more detailed view of each component.
Harmonizer
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Fig. 1: The RADISH System Architecture Normalized streams
are fed to both RADISH-L that generates models of typical
user behavior and to RADISH-A that uses these models to
detect anomalous behavior.
A. Sensors
Sensors are devices and applications capable of relaying
information on user, asset, or resource utilization to the
Harmonizer. In principle, any information source that can
communicate over a network can be included as an information
stream into RADISH. Examples of sensors currently available
include various log files such as HTTP logs, email logs, system
call logs, Centrify command data [20], Guardium database
access data [21], and Windows system event logs [22].
B. Harmonizer
The Harmonizer, Figure 2, normalizes events generated
by different sensor streams into a common data format in
addition to time-ordering them. To that end, the Harmonizer
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performs the functions of transforming data, performing iden-
tity resolution for objects in the stream, and providing any
additional enrichment needed. For a large production system
covering disparate locations in an organization, numerous
Harmonizers could operate in parallel, each handling events
from an appropriate sub-set of entities being monitored by the
system.
When a new stream is introduced into RADISH, a plug-
in must be implemented that provides the custom processing
required to convert the sensor’s events into the Harmonizer’s
common data forat. The Harmonizer provides services to the
plug-in to aid in this process. The first is an identity resolution
service that resolves any primary identifiers associated with the
event (such as Unix login names, e-mail addresses, and mac
addresses) into a common identifier (such as employee IDs and
inventory IDs) that can be easily recognized by downstream
components. The second service is enrichment that attaches
metadata to the event that may be inconvenient or impossible
to add at the sensor. For instance, data from a building access
control system might be enriched with the IDs of devices that
are associated with the people entering the building (such as
their cell phone or work station IDs). This data, in general,
is not available to access control systems, but is helpful in
establishing correlations if anomalous behavior is associated
with users’ devices. The third service is a joining of streams,
where multiple streams can be joined together according to
a join criterion, resulting in one or more derived streams.
For instance, streams corresponding to different activities by
the same user, such as web browsing history, file access, and
emails can be combined into a single stream containing all
activities of the user. Of the tasks required of the Harmonizer,
the first three (transforming events to a common format, event
enrichment, and identity resolution) require no information
exchange between the events and can be performed in an
embarassingly parallel fashion. Time ordering of the events
proves more problematic, but can be resolved by partitioning
the stream based on time intervals, sorting each partition
separately, and then recombining the sub-streams in order
according to their interval.
C. RADISH-L: Streaming Machine Learning
RADISH-L ingests events from the Harmonizer, extracts
and aggregates relevant features from these events, and dy-
namically creates statistical models representing patterns of
normalcy that are then utilized by RADISH-A. This module
has to operate under near real-time constraints to rapidly
provide accurate models at high data velocity without using
large amounts of storage.
Typical streaming machine learning algorithms face several
challenges. First, raw data must be converted to a representa-
tion that can be efficiently utilized by the specific algorithm.
These representations are known in the machine learning
community as feature vectors. For streaming data, multiple
events in the stream are usually aggregated to construct a
single feature vector. For instance, all the events from a
single session of a user’s interaction with a database can be
aggregated to derive a single feature vector represention of the
session.
For our insider threat detection system, anomalies can
usually be explained as a series of abnormal actions, e.g. a
user logs on outside of their usual working hours, connects
an external device, such as a USB drive, to their workstation,
and transfers a large amount of data. Thus, the system needs to
maintain a state object, corresponding to a feature vector, that
is continually updated as data arrives. The system also needs
to maintain criteria that dictate when to pass the featuer vector
to the trainer to update its internal parameters. An additional
challenge in developing models on streaming data is that
machine learning algorithms are typically designed for the case
when the data is available all at once. It is non-trivial to modify
the algorithms for the case when data arrives sequentially,
requiring the models to be incrementally updated. Thus, our
system requires specialized machine learning algorithms for
dynamically processing streaming data.
In particular, we need algorithms that scale to large data sets
and provide accurate results at high processing throughput.
We consider two subtasks here – streaming feature vector
generation and streaming machine learning. With current
streaming platforms, such as Apache Spark [17] or Apache
Storm [16], the key to scaling to high data rates is the ability
to parallelize each subtask by (logically) dividing the data into
multiple substreams, perhaps one per entity, or by partitioning
the stream by key.
For instance, to detect unusual user actions signifying po-
tential insider threats, we may want to derive per-user streams
and construct feature vectors for each user through a sequential
process that maintains state for the user’s current session and
then outputs a feature vector aggregating all events within that
session. A session may be determined by the interval between
user logon and logoff, or by other given measures, such as
an regular time period (hour or day). Machine learning then
occurs on a stream of such feature vectors. Further research
will be conducted on which session definitions yield optimal
results.
Online model management and updates. Trained models
built from streaming data are passed to RADISH-A for detect-
ing anomalies. For both research and production systems, we
use a database to store serialized models for several reasons.
First, keeping track of models trained in the past can give
insight into how the nature of more recent data has changed
and can be useful for detecting concept drift. Second, it
allows trained models to be loaded and used immediately or
further updated with the most recent data, allowing for greater
flexibility in both testing and production environments.
D. RADISH-A: Streaming Anomaly Detection
RADISH-A, Figure 3, uses the models ascertained during
the learning phase to identify abnormalities in the event stream
coming from the Harmonizer. Abnormalities, if determined to
be of sufficient risk, are then elevated to an alert and reported
to analysts or security operators via the controller.
In order to make the above determination, the RADISH-A
utilizes a multi-tiered structure. At the lowest tier, normalized
events from the Harmonizer are processed using specific
rules determined from RADISH-L. We refer to such as “Tier
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Fig. 2: Design of the stream harmonizer - The Harmonizer prepares the stream for further analysis by merging the data streams
from the various sensors, performs identity resolution and enrichment, provides a common data format, and attempts to time
order the events.
1” events; currently we consider different types of Tier 1
events, such as those related to credential fraud, inappropriate
data access, or data exfiltration. The rules for detecting such
events are specific to the user or entity involved. Multiple
Tier 1 events are combined into Tier 2 events that focus on
macro-level alerts that implement system-wide or role-specifc
policies. Such alerts include the underlying Tier 1 events that
contributed to the Tier 2 events. While we use only two tiers
in the current implementation and architecture, additional tiers
can easily be added.
We chose this multi-tier architecture for the RADISH sys-
tem because it lends itself to a clean separation of logic be-
tween what constitutes suspicious activity and what conditions
should warrant an alert. The benefit of this separation becomes
apparent when considering the trade-off that naturally occurs
when balancing Type I (false positive) and Type II (false
negative) errors. In order to reduce Type I errors, a system’s
rules need to be made specific, capturing the proclivities of
individual situations which may be out of the ordinary, but
not malicious. This specificity tends to make the rules cumber-
some, complicated, and brittle (i.e. we would have to look for
a very specific set of events to fire an alert for a specific user),
leading to an increase in Type II errors. The multi-tier system
allows us to specify what is considered suspicious at the level
of the individual user, asset, or resource, where we can take
into account unique aspects of the object under consideration
automatically via machine learning techniques. At the higher
level, we can then define generalized policies as to which types
of suspicious behaviors warrant an alert. This allows us, to a
certain extent, to minimize both Type I and Type II errors.
Furthermore, the multi-tier system facilitates maintaining
and augmenting the system while communicating the cause of
alerts to the security analyst. As it turns out, the functions are
linked in a very natural way. As a general rule, the complexity
of a system has a direct impact on the difficulty of elucidating
why a particular aspect of the system is set up the way it
is and of changing an element to either fix or augment the
system. For the complex event engine, the lower tier is purely
dedicated to identifying what is suspicious activity and, as
such, gives rise to relatively simple rules that are easy to follow
(e.g. User X causes an inappropriate access event because they
have accessed a database they usually don’t use). Similarly, the
second tier focuses purely on what constitutes an alert (e.g.
User X caused an alert because they had 5 inappropriate access
events in the last 30 minutes). When communicating this to
the end user, the information is already grouped in a manner
that facilitates and invites further exploration (from alert to
originating suspicious events), so that they can determine the
appropriate response action.
E. Controller
Finally, the RADISH system includes a graphical user
interface that is organized around the concept of an “analyst
dashboard”. The main window acts as a container for various
component displays and controls that allow the security analyst
to control the operation of the system and maintain situational
awareness using data visualization. The data comes from two
main sources, alerts from RADISH-A and sensor events from
the Harmonizer. These are updated over time while a context
of alerts and behaviors is built up for each user, and are
displayed in a fashion that allows the analyst to see the
correlated behaviors that lead to alerts.
IV. IMPLEMENTATION
The described RADISH system has been implemented as a
prototype in order to demonstrate the feasibility and efficacy
of the chosen architecture. In this section, we provide details
of our implementation.
A. Runtime Environment
In order to verify that the proposed system can operate in a
fully distributed manner, the system was run on a small cluster,
Table I, comprising three Dell PowerEdge T105 Tower Servers
networked through a D-Link DGS-2208 8 port switch. Each
node in the cluster was configured with Java 1.8.0 20, zeromq-
2.2.0, Apache-Hadoop 2.5.0 and Spark 0.9.1 compiled against
Hadoop 2. All inter-process communication was effected using
the zeroMQ socket library.
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Fig. 3: Architectural framework of the RADISH-A system. The lower tier (Tier I) uses automatically trained models to identify
anomalous activities in the stream. Tier II uses a combination of hand-coded rules and learned models to aggregate anomalous
activities into alerts.
B. Component Implementation
In this prototype implementation, the harmonizer and sen-
sors are written in Scala. The sensors are assumed to gen-
erate data in CSV format; wrappers can easily be written
to accommodate other streaming data formats. For experi-
mentation, evaluation, and demonstration purposes, we aug-
mented the harmonizer with the capability to read data from
pre-determined log files in CSV format representing “pre-
recorded” data. Since, for non-production purposes, we do not
necessarily want the system run time to correspond exactly to
the data event times, the harmonizer contains an internal clock
that can be set to run at an arbitrary multiple of wall time. The
harmonizer dispatches events to RADISH-A and RADISH-
L according to the timestamp of the event. Enrichment and
identity resolution are performed using in-memory maps that
relate primary and universal identifiers. Inter-process commu-
nication between the Harmonizer and RADISH-A/L follows
the Publish-Subscribe (pub/sub) design pattern. In this case,
the harmonizer publishes to an “events” topic, to which the
controller, RADISH-A, and RADISH-L subscribe.
A typical dashboard layout was created for the prototype
using JavaFX selected since it is part of the current Java
core language. It supports simple 2D graphics as well as
more complex 3D visualizations and animations. Sensor data
is presented on the right side of the UI and allows the analyst
to see the correlated behaviors that led to alerts and also create
a forensic timeline. Detailed information on each alert event is
also logged and displayed in a console window. This detailed
data can also be used to investigate the nature of alert events.
Event and alert data can be obtained by subscribing to the
harmonizer and alerts topic respectively. Commands are issued
to other processes (harmonizer, RADISH-A, and RADISH-L)
using a request-reply pattern [23].
The streaming feature vector generation and online mod-
eling training components of RADISH-L are built using
Apache’s Spark Streaming engine. Spark Streaming leverages
Spark’s Resilient Distributed Dataset (RDD) data structure
by treating a stream as a sequence of batch RDDs, known
as discretized streams (DStreams). Each RDD is processed
through a sequence of transformations such as map and
reduce; our streaming feature generation and machine learning
modules are written as a pipeline of such transformations.
RADISH-A has been implemented using ESPER, an open
source Complex Event Processing (CEP) framework [24]. We
chose to implement the prototype system using ESPER with an
eye towards extending our models to perform more complex
event monitoring tasks such as frequent episode mining. ES-
PER’s API includes a straightforward regular expression-like
syntax for identifying multi-stage events in a stream which
will greatly facilitate capturing episodes of interest. All alerts
generated by RADISH-A are published to the “alerts” topic
that is monitored by the controller.
Separate frameworks were chosen for implementing
RADISH-A and RADISH-L to address the differing needs of
the learning and alerting process. Spark-Streaming allows for
very fine grained control over the events in the stream which
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facilitates model training and pattern discovery. ESPER’s high
level abstraction for specifying event patterns allows the rapid
implementation and maintenance of alerting rules expressed
in a straightforward and relatively easy to understand manner.
TABLE I: Spark Cluster Properties
Hydra-01 Hydra-02 Hydra-03
HDFS Function Data Node Data Node Data Node
Name Node
Spark Function Slave Node Slave Node Slave Node
Master Node
Processor Quad-Core AMD
OpteronTM 1300 Series
Quad-Core AMD
OpteronTM 1300 Series
Quad-Core AMD
OpteronTM 1300 Series
Storage 500 GB Main
2 TB HDFS
150 GB Main
2 TB HDFS
150 GB Main
500 GB HDFS
RAM 8 GB 8 GB 8 GB
V. INSIDER THREAT DETECTION USING RADISH
We describe the application of RADISH to the insider threat
problem along with the corresponding experimental results in
terms of accuracy and speed.
A. Description of the Dataset
The DARPA ADAMS dataset [5] was synthesized by Exact-
Data LLC using a dynamic data generator tool. It consists of
a number of log files, including one file for Logon/Logoff
events, one for events related to removable devices, one
for HTTP accesses, one for email messages, and one for
information in the LDAP directory. We replay the data as a
continuous stream of events in timestamp order for real-time
streaming analysis by RADISH in order to detect anomalous
and possibly malicious behavior of system insiders in this
system.
Ten sample synthetic datasets created by ExactData are
available from the CERT Insider Threat Center at CMU’s
SEI. They are numbered according to the generator version
that was used to create them. For this report, we used the
r2 dataset which simulates the behavior of 1,000 employees
recorded over 494 days, resulting in more than 430 million
events (see Table II). Among more than 375 thousand sessions,
6 sessions are known to be malicious. This low number of
malicious sessions represents a realistic scenario, where the
objective is to find the proverbial needle in haystack while
keeping the false positives to a minimum. We labeled a session
as malicious, if the session contains one or more events that
were part of a malicious activity.
B. Data Processing Method
RADISH processes this data as follows (see Figure 4). The
sensors consist of the different log files. Thus we have one
TABLE II: Statistic of the CERT Insider Threat r2 dataset
r2 Count
Number of Users 1,000
Number of Days 494
Number of Events 434,624,511
Number of Sessions 375,678
Number of Malicious Sessions 6
sensor each for HTTP logs, Logon events, events on removable
devices, and email messages.
The harmonizer joins the data streams from all the sen-
sors resulting in a composite stream of all system events in
timestamp order. This composite stream is then partitioned
into substreams consisting of a timestamp ordered sequence of
events for each user (per-user stream). The harmonizer handles
streams in real-time, typically without needing to buffer large
amounts of data (larger buffers are needed when the different
sensor sources are not synchronized in time).
The first step in RADISH-L is streaming segmentation,
Performed at the level of a user session. Each per-user stream
is further divided into a number of sessions consisting of all
events within a single login session of a user. Each session is
further treated as a single (complex) object that is the focus
of further analysis.
The next step is feature vector generation. Each user
session, which consists of a complex sequence of events, is
converted into a feature vector that can be processed by a
machine learning algorithm. For the ADAMS dataset, we use
five attributes to represent a user session as a feature vector:
the start hour, the duration (in minutes), the number of emails
sent, the presence/absence of removable media (a binary
attribute), and the number of HTTP accesses. These features
were chosen to be easily interpretable and readily available in
the dataset. Feature vectors of sessions are constructed and
updated dynamically as more events arrive in the session.
When a session is complete, the feature vector corresponding
to the session is normalized so that the attribute along each
dimension lies between 0 and 1. Note, this normalization step
is important so that no single dimension dominates all others.
The normalized vectors are then used for machine learning.
It must be noted that for our particular application of anomaly
detection, we adopt unsupervised machine learning algorithms
to determine if any single feature vector deviates appreciably
from its neighboring points. Thus, there is no a-priori labeling
of each vector from which to learn a discriminative classifier.
In general though, the processing framework described above
can use both supervised and unsupervised methods.
Streaming versions of machine learning or data mining tasks
such as classification, clustering, or anomaly detection require
significantly different methods than those used by traditional
batch techniques. We illustrate the issues involved in the
context of designing a streaming version of the Unsupervised
k-nearest neighbor (kNN) anomaly detector [25] that we have
used in out current implementation. Going forward in this
paper, unless otherwise indicated, kNN will always refer to
the streaming unsupervised version of kNN. Likewise, Point
will always refer to a user session. In the kNN anomaly
detector, when a new point arrives, we compute the kth
smallest distance to the points observed so far and use this as
the anomaly score of the point. If the anomaly score exceeds
a threshold τ , then the point is regarded as anomalous. The
first few points are used to learn typical behavior of the
user session. Among the anomalous sessions that are found,
particular attention will be paid to ones that access both files
and removable media devices, since these will help identify
suspicious sessions. One potential issue with this approach
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Fig. 4: Data Processing Pipeline for Detecting Insider Threats
is that if the first few sessions are in any way anomalous to
an individual’s normal behavior, the model may exhibit some
undesirable characteristics, such as generating many initial
false positives. This is alleviated by incorporating bayesian
priors, domain expertise, or additional information about the
new users to initialize expected behavior.
The naı¨ve algorithm for implementing kNN is as follows:
For every new point s that arrives, we compute the distance of
s from all other points seen so far. This allows us to compute
the kNN metric of the point that is based on the k-th smallest
distance. However, this method scales poorly as the data size
increases, since its total runtime over n arrivals increases as
Θ(n2), making it unsuitable for handling large data sets.
A faster implementation of kNN is obtained as follows: A
k-d tree [26] is a data structure for multi-dimensional points
that organizes points in a tree by recursively partitioning
the universe using axis-parallel hyperplanes. These provide
an efficient solution to a number of multi-dimensional data
structuring problems, including range searching and nearest
neighbors. We adapt the k-d tree for finding the k nearest
neighbors of a query point. One issue with the k-d tree is
that the data structure is static, i.e. the points have to all be
provided in advance before the data structure is constructed.
We derive a dynamic k-d tree through applying the Bentley-
Saxe transform [27] to the static k-d tree [26]. This allows us
to design a dynamic data structure by repeatedly constructing
larger (static) k-d trees through merging smaller k-d trees (see
also [28]).
The dynamic structure based on k-d trees is much faster
than the naı¨ve implementation whose cost grows as O(n2)
(for n insertions). To compare the costs, we ran an experiment
Fig. 5: The dynamic k-d tree implementation is much faster
than simple kNN data structures on large datasets.
comparing our implementations of both data structures when
applied to kNN, testing using synthetic data. The experiment
inserted a sequence of n points and, before each insertion,
queried for the set of k = 3 nearest neighbors to the inserted
point. The total time is shown in Figure 5. This clearly shows
that the algorithm for kNN based on a dynamic k-d tree
significantly outperforms the naı¨ve algorithm. The runtime of
the kNN algorithm increases almost linearly with the size of
the stream and the number of queries.
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Our algorithm for kNN anomaly detection is built using the
dynamic k-d tree index described above. The first few sessions
for each user are used only for training and anomaly detection
is not performed. Then upon arrival of a new session, the
system checks if it is anomalous using the kNN query using
the index. The point is also inserted into the index. If the
session is deemed anomalous then an alert is generated.
We briefly contrast the streaming with batch kNN. In batch
kNN, the entire batch of points is analyzed all at once. For
each data point, the kth smallest distance to another point
in the set is used to compute the anomaly score of the
point. There is room to pre-process the entire dataset so that
nearest neighbor distance queries are answered as quickly as
possible. The statically generated index tends to be faster than
the dynamically generated one, so the total time of anomaly
detection using streaming kNN is greater than the total time
using the static kNN data structure.
The set of attributes used in our feature vectors are primarily
chosen to achieve transparency and interpretibility in our
models, and to serve as a baseline for more sophisticated
models to come in the future. Partitioning events by user
sessions has the intuitive meaning of grouping sequences of
events between natural breaking points in a user’s day. Sliding
window-based approaches that evaluate sequences of events
every hour or several hours are a natural extension of this
idea and address, at least partially, the problem of delayed
detection that is inherent to using a session-based approach.
Further feature transformation and extraction techniques along
with nonlinear machine learning models may also improve
accuracy on this dataset. Nevertheless, exploring these ideas,
among various others, is beyond the scope of this current
work, which is intended to be a proof-of-concept framework
for applying streaming anomaly detection algorithms at scale,
where any set of features and machine learning algorithms may
be plugged in easily. Follow on work will consider a deeper
analysis of the aforementioned topics and will also use real
rather than synthetic datasets.
C. Experimental Results
We now describe the results of applying RADISH to the
ADAMS sets in terms of accuracy and performance.
Accuracy: We considered two approaches for event parti-
tioning: 1) User-based detection, and 2) Role-based detection.
In user-based detection, we computed the kNN anomaly score
of each user session with respect to previous sessions of the
same user (seen so far). In role-based detection, we computed
the kNN anomaly score of each user session with respect to
all previous sessions of all users with the same role within the
organization, as observed in the LDAP user directory (also
provided as a part of the dataset).
Figure 6 shows the cummulative distribution function (CDF)
of the anomaly scores derived applying both user- and role-
based detection for over 375 thousand sessions of the r2
dataset, including the 6 malicious sessions. The sessions are
ranked in increasing order of their anomaly scores. For user-
based detection, the malicious sessions are ranked in the top
500 sessions. For role-based detection, the malicious sessions
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Fig. 6: Sessions ranked by the `3 7NN score for the r2 dataset,
using user-based (6a) and role-based (6b) partitioning.
are ranked in the top 10,000 sessions. Thus, at least in
this instance, user-based partitioning is more accurate than
role-based partitioning. Our system will provide support for
different types of partitioning as appropriate.
For illustration, we examine the characteristics of repre-
sentative feature vectors in user-based detection, to see how
user behavior affects the anomaly score of the coresponding
session. Figures 6a and 6b show the session data and raw
feature vectors for one malicious and one normal session by
ONS0995, a malicious user. For simplicity, we compare the
raw feature vectors of the malicious and normal sessions, that
are determined directly from the associated session events. For
a complete determination of the anomaly score, the normalized
feature vector is used, which relies on knowledge of all prior
feature vectors for a user. The normal session, Figure (7b),
with an anomaly score of 5.3 × 10−3, is in some sense,
representative of the normal behavior of the user. Comparing
the feature vector of the normal session with that of the mali-
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cious session, Figure (7a), we can see that for an `3 distance
measure, three components will contribute significantly and
result in a large anomaly score; 1) the unusual start time;
2) the lack of significant e-mail activity; and 3) the mounting
of an external storage device.
Applying a specific threshold on the anomaly score leads to
a method that can classify user sessions as either malicious or
benign. Figure 8 shows the precision and recall using the two
methods described above, user-based detection and role-based
detection, as a function of the threshold.
We note there is a scarcity of published work providing
concrete precision and recall results of insider threat detection
using public datasets, including the DARPA ADAMS dataset.
To put our results in context, consider the user-based detection
results in Figure 8. A threshold value slightly greater than 1
yields a recall of about 0.5 and a precision of about 0.08.
Thus, about 50 percent of all malicious sessions are detected
and about 92 percent of sessions that are flagged malicious
are actually benign. While this may seem high, the amount of
labor required to follow up on the false positives is still lower
than the potential losses caused by an undetected malicious
event. For example, suppose an enterprise security operator
takes on average four hours to adjudicate a detected session
as truly malicious or not and costs $200,000 per year working
40 hours a week. Over the 18 month duration of the ADAMS
set, continuous 24x7 monitoring would require 4.2 operators
costing $1.26 million to adjudicate a total of 3,285 sessions.
According to [29] the average cost to remediate a successful
insider attack is $445,000, or $2.67 million for all 6 malicious
sessions of the ADAMS set that would have been detected.
Thus, when compared with the significant losses that could be
incurred by an insider attack, the cost of handling false alarms
is small.
For user-based detection, we observe that precision in-
creases monotonically with the threshold and recall decreases
monotonically. For role-based detection, the precision is much
worse than with user-based detection, and the best precision
we can achieve is about 0.0016. Role-based detection is doing
worse because there are “normal” sessions from other users
that are close to the malicious sessions of the insider that
lead to a smaller anomaly score for the malicious sessions.
Broadening the class of sessions to all sessions of users with
the same role does not seem to help, in this case.
Performance: Figure 9 shows the result of our study in-
vestigating the performance of the RADISH-L training compo-
nent with an eye towards estimating the maximum capacity (in
events/second) that can be handled by the trainer. We examine
the batch processing time, i.e. the amount of time it takes for
a 10 second mini-batch of data to be processed, as a function
of the average throughput of the system. The time it takes
to process each batch is a critical parameter for ensuring that
all data arriving to the system can be fully processed before
ingesting the next batch. If the batch processing time exceeds
the delay between batches, the system can become unstable.
This scan was repeated for a single node pseudo distributed
cluster and a fully distributed three node cluster. As can be
seen in Figure 9, at 230 events per second, the single node
system is barely taxing the CPU, with spare batch processing
10−3 10−2 10−1 100 101
0
0.2
0.4
Pr
ec
is
io
n
Threshold
 
 
0
0.5
1
R
ec
al
l
Precision
Recall
(a) User-based Detection
10−3 10−2 10−1
0
1
2
x 10−3
Pr
ec
is
io
n
Threshold
 
 
0
0.5
1
R
ec
al
l
Precision
Recall
(b) Role-based Detection
Fig. 8: Precision and recall as a function of the threshold with
7NN using `3 distance on r2 dataset
time of approximately 8.4s. Assuming a linear increase in
delay with throughput, a least squares fit to the data in Figure 9
yields an estimate of the relationship between throughput and
delay of delay1Node = 0.0064 ∗ throughput+ 0.0587. Given
this estimate, we expect that the pseudo cluster can handle an
average throughput of approximately 1,550 events per second.
As would be expected, expanding to a three node cluster
reduces the batch processing time by approximately a third;
delay3Node = 0.0021 ∗ throughput+ 0.3288. At the low end
of the throughput, approximately 45 events per second, the
pseudo cluster and the three node cluster have near identical
performance. This odd behavior results from the fact that the
load on the cluster CPUs is very light at these low volumes
and the major cost associated with the processing is incurred
by network traffic and the overhead of administering a process
over a distributed cluster.
VI. FUTURE WORK AND CONCLUSION
Future Work. The RADISH system described above aims
to extend the massively parallel on-line machine learning tech-
niques pioneered by companies such as Amazon and LinkedIn
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Source    Event Log Line 
logon.csv    3/19/2010 22:04:38,ONS0995,PC-3585,Logon  
device.csv   3/20/2010 1:47:28,ONS0995,PC-3585,Insert  
http.csv     3/20/2010 01:59:32,ONS0995,PC-3585,http://wikileaks.org   
device.csv   3/20/2010 5:38:08,ONS0995,PC-3585,Remove  
logon.csv    3/20/2010 8:10:12,ONS0995,PC-3585,Logoff 
22 
606 
1 
0 
0 
1 
logon hour 
duration 
# http 
# file 
# e-mails 
USB connect 
Raw Feature Vector 
(a) Malicious Session for user ONS0995; User-based detection anomaly score = 1.8
Source    Event Log Line 
logon.csv    2/15/2010 8:45:00,ONS0995,PC-3585,Logon 
HPDLOFVY&DPHUDQ0LUD6KRUW#GWDDFRP«2WWR1HUR6FKZDUW]#GWDDFRP 
HPDLOFVY*DUHWK(ULFK&DVK#GWDDFRP«2WWR1HUR6FKZDUW]#GWDDFRP 
http.csv     02/15/2010 14:09:53,ONS0995,PC-3585,http://bright.net 
email.csv    2/15/2010 16:21:44,Cameran.Mira.Short@dtaa.com,Otto.Nero.Schwartz@dtaa.com 
email.csv    2/15/2010 18:07:20,Gareth.Erich.Cash@dtaa.com,Otto.Nero.Schwartz@dtaa.com 
email.csv    2/15/2010 18:53:45,Alfonso.Maxwell.Phelps@dtaa.com,Otto.Nero.Schwartz@dtaa.com 
email.csv    2/15/2010 19:43:16,Cameran.Mira.Short@dtaa.com,Otto.Nero.Schwartz@dtaa.com 
email.csv    2/15/2010 20:39:08,Gareth.Erich.Cash@dtaa.com,Otto.Nero.Schwartz@dtaa.com 
HPDLOFVY&DPHUDQ0LUD6KRUW#GWDDFRP«2WWR1HUR6FKZDUW]#GWDDFRP 
logon.csv    2/15/2010 20:46:00,ONS0995,PC-3585,Logoff 
8 
721 
1 
0 
8 
0 
logon hour 
duration 
# http 
# file 
# e-mails 
USB connect 
Raw Feature Vector 
(b) Normal Session for user ONS0995; User-based detection anomaly score = 5.3× 10−3
Fig. 7: Example event data and feature vectors for a malicious (7a) and normal (7b) session.
Fig. 9: Batch processing delay for the training system on a
one node and three node clusters.
to provide a comprehensive system for anomaly detection
in general, and for detecting and alerting on insider threats
specifically. RADISH is capable of continuously modeling
the actions of individual elements of an organization and
then identifying suspicious activities in real time. Furthermore,
the system is readily scalable due to its design using open
source software for distributed processing frameworks and
commodity hardware.
Further work will augment this system as follows:
1) Implement and test the system with much larger data
and stream sizes
2) Incorporate a feedback mechanism to include data that
identified by RADISH and labeled by an analyst
3) Model session evolution so that abnormality conditions
can be determined while the session is still in progress
4) Model additional aspects of the organization, including
document and hardware resources
Conclusion. RADISH aims to ameliorate the modern in-
sider threat issue. Using real-time streaming data analytics and
machine learning techniques, RADISH automatically identifies
the normal behaviors within an organization, allowing security
operators to quickly focus on unusual and suspicious activities.
By encompassing analysis of, and correlation among, multi-
stream data, RADISH also ensures that bread crumbs to
malicious activities that are spread across numerous domains
do not go unnoticed as they might in siloed applications
intended to protect individual assets.
As a comprehensive system, RADISH enables organizations
to focus their security personnel where they can be the most
effective. The automatic aspect of the learning phase frees the
analyst from the tedious and time consuming task of profiling
individual users of a system. Counter intuitively, this automa-
tion given the analyst the capacity to spread her investigation
to all levels of the organization, not just individuals that have
been identified to pose a high threat. Further, the multi-tiered
detection system allows analysts to operate at the highest level
in the information chain, crafting policies that can be applied
across any segment of the organization. The open architecture
allows easy implementation of custom sensors for analyzing
behavior and/or Tier 1 logic for identifying suspicious events.
Together, these features allow RADISH to be tailored to a
specific organization at all levels.
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